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BLACK LUNG BENEFITS AMENDMENTS OF 1981:
TRANSFER OF SPECIAL CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 205
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL BLACK LUNG PROGRAM1
In 1969, Congress established the first federally funded and administered
black lung compensation program.2 The increasing demand for federal aid to
disabled miners, an area 6raditionally left to the regulation of the states,' re-
sulted in a clash of social and political viewpoints. Advocates of the program
argued that a federal response was made necessary by the failure of state
governments to assume responsibility for the welfare of miners afflicted with
occupational disease.4' Program opponents, on the other hand, denounced the
move as an attempted "federalization" of the various state workers' compen-
sation systems.' Federal intervention in the area unduly encroached on state
interests, opposition leaders opined, and would discourage states from im-
proving their own compensation programsP The comprehensive plan which
ultimately received congressional approval was (in form, at least) responsive
to the concerns voiced by both groups. Benefits under the Act were payable
to miners who suffered total disability due to pneumoconiosis, and to surviv-
ing spouses of deceased miners whose deaths were attributable to that
disease.' Federal agencies were charged with overseeing the operations of
the program for a period of approximately three years; thereafter, the re-
sponsibility for black lung benefits was to be transferred to the states under
approved workers' compensation programs.8
In order to facilitate the transition from federal to state authority, claims
were divided into two classes. Responsibility for payment of claims filed on
or before December 31, 1972 ("Part B" claims) was to be borne by the federal
treasury, and the attendant administrative duties were to be performed by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).9 Claims filed on or
' For a more detailed discussion of the history of the federal black lung benefits program, see
Lopatto, The Federal Black Lung Program: A 1983 Primer, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 677 (1983); 1B A.
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 41.91 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
2 Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83
Stat. 792 (1969) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-36 (1970)) (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45
(Supp. V 1981)).
1 Dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of state compensation programs in this area resulted in
"an extraordinary resort to federal power to rectify the situation or to induce the states to do so."
LARSON, supra note 1, § 41.90; see also 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 901(a)
(Supp. V 1981)) (congressional findings and declaration of purpose).
' See H. R. REP. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2503, 2514-16 (report of committee majority on the House version of the bill).
See id. at 2573 (supplemental views of minority members).
Id. at 2575.
30 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 922(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
30 U.S.C. § 931(a) (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 931(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
30 U.S.C. §§ 921-24 (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 921-24 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); and
30 U.S.C. § 902(c) (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 902(c) (Supp. V 1981)). More specifically
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after January 1, 1973 ("Part C" claims) were to be processed under the appro-
priate state workers' compensation law, provided it met certain statutory re-
quirements" and was formally approved by the Department of Labor (DOL).1
If no approved state law was involved, the claim would be processed by the
DOL and payment of benefits made by the responsible coal operator 2 (either
through its insurance carrier or self-insurance).13 Where no responsible opera-
tor could be identified, payment of benefits would be made out of general fed-
eral revenues. 4
This statutory scheme has been amended on numerous occasions, the
first such amendment occurring in 1972.15 A primary purpose of the 1972
amendment was to defer the transition from Part B to Part C claims for a
period of one year. The period during which Part B claims could be filed was
extended to June 30, 1973.16 A new section (section 415)" was added to the act
to promote a more orderly transfer to Part C claims. Under this provision,
claims filed between July 1 and December 31, 1973 were to be administered
by the DOL, but responsibility for payment of benefits remained with the
federal government.18 Part C claims would begin on January 1, 1974.19
The most sweeping changes in the federal black lung program occurred
in 1977.20 A special revenue fund, the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund
these duties were carried out by the Social Security Administration which is a part of the Depart-
ment of HEW. (Department of HEW has recently been changed to the Department of Health and
Human Services).
10 Among the requirements for approval by the DOL were the following:
(1) benefits must be payable for a miner's death or total disability due to pneumoconiosis;
(2) the amount of benefits must be greater than or equal to that available under Part B
of the act;
(3) the standards for determining death and total disability for purposes of receiving ben-
efits must be substantially the same as those applied under Part B;
(4) the period for filing a claim must be at least three years from the date of death or dis-
covery of the condition; and
(5) provision must be made for the liability of mine operators who purchase or acquire a
substantial interest in a mine after a claimant's right to benefits has accrued.
30 U.S.C. § 931(b)(2) (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 931(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981)).
11 30 U.S.C. § 931(b)(1) (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 931(b)(1) (1976)).
1 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
13 30 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1970) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1976)).
", 30 U.S.C. § 934 (1970) (amended by 30 U.S.C. § 934(b) (Supp. V 1981)).
"5 Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (codified at 30 U.S.C.
§§ 901-41 (Supp. II 1972)) (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
" 30 U.S.C. § 924(b) (Supp. H 1972) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 924(b) (1976)).
'7 30 U.S.C. § 925 (Supp. H 1972) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 925 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
Section 415 of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act is codified at 30 U.S.C. § 925.
18 Id.
19 30 U.S.C. § 931(a) (Supp. H 1972) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 931(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92 Stat. 11 (1978) (codified in
scattered sections of 26 and 30 U.S.C. (Supp. H 1978); Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977,
1024 [Vol. 86
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(Trust Fund), was established to provide a source of money earmarked for
payment of approved claims.2 Additionally, Congress made marked changes
in the program's entitlement criteria. A series of interim presumptions
-some of which were irrebuttable - were enacted to aid claimants in obtain-
ing compensation,' and clanges were effected regarding the admissability of
evidence in administrative hearings on the validity of benefits claims under
Part B.1 But the most far-reaching proposal of the 1977 amendment was the
retroactive application of the liberalized eligibility provisions. 4 A special
mechanism was established (section 435)1 in order to review claims that were
to be reopened for evaluation in light of the new amendments. A claimant
whose Part B claim had been denied could elect to have such denial reviewed
by either the Department of HEW or the DOL.2 8 Review by the Department
of HEW was to be limited to information then available in the claim file;
review by the DOL was to be a de novo proceeding, and the claimant was per-
mitted to introduce new evidence. Part C claims which were pending or
denied prior to the enactment of the 1977 amendments, as well as denied sec-
tion 415 claims, were subject to automatic review by the DOL.
The crucial question which remained unanswered in the wake of the 1977
amendments was who should bear responsibility for payment of claims which
had been previously denied, but were thereafter approved under section 435.
The various courts which addressed the issue came to very different re-
sults. 9 Against this background of judicial uncertainty, Congress enacted the
Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981.11 The 1981 amendments were a
double-edged sword: they sought to tighten the entitlement provisions of Ti-
tle IV of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act in an effort to restore solv-
Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (Supp. II 1978)). These amend-
ments were passed in December of 1977 but actually became effective in March, 1978. In this ar-
ticle they will referred to as the 1977 amendments.
2S 30 U.S.C. § 934(a) (Supp. H 1978) (amended by 26 U.S.C. § 9501 (Supp. V 1981)).
The interim presumptions originally promulgated by the Secretary of HEW, with a very
liberal definition of "total disability," were made binding on the DOL by operation of 30 U.S.C.
§ 902(f) (Supp. II 1978). See also Lopatto, supra note 1, at 691-92 (discussing the liberalizing fea-
tures of the 1977 act).
30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (Supp. II 1978) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (Supp. V 1981)).
2 30 U.S.C. § 945 (Supp. II 1978) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 945 (Supp. V 1981)). Section
435 of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act is codified at 30 U.S.C. § 945.
uId.
2 30 U.S.C. § 945(a) (Supp. II 1978) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 945(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
30 U.S.C. § 945(a)(2)(A), § 945(b)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1978) (current version at 30 U.S.C.
§ 945(a)(2}(A), § 945(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981)).
30 U.S.C. § 945(b)(1) (Supp. H 1978) (current version at 30 U.S.C. § 945(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981)).
29 See, e.g., Director v. Republic Steel Corp., 663 F.2d 8 (3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam), 3 BLACK
LUNG REP. (MB) 2-73 (1981) (affirming a Benefits Review Board decision holding the Trust Fund
liable for payment of benefits); Director v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 669 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. 1982), 4
BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) 2-44 (1982) (holding responsible operators liable for benefits).
I Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1643 (codified in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981)).
1984] 1025
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ency to the Trust Fund"' and, quite inconsistently, to transfer liability for
some of the claims approved under section 435 from responsible operators to
the Trust Fund.2 The transfer provison (section 205)' encompassed all claims
which were "the subject of a claim denied before March 1, 1978 [the effective
date of the 1977 amendments] and which [are] or [have] been approved in ac-
cordance with the provisions of section 945."1 The term "claim denied" was
defined for purposes of this section as any claim which was (1) denied by the
Department of HEW (that is, a Part B claim); (2) denied informally by the
DOL more than one year prior to the effective date of the 1977 amendments,
and in which the claimant "abandoned" his claim;"' and (3) denied by the DOL
following a formal hearing under the law in effect prior to the 1977 amend-
ments." Responsibility for all other claims approved following section 435 re-
view remained on the responsible operator.
II. SECTION 205 AND THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Perhaps the foremost rule of statutory construction is that courts should
attempt to determine and effectuate the "legislative intent."" This is neces-
sary, of course, in order to provide an interpretation that is in harmony with
both the language of the statute and the legitimate purpose or end sought to
be achieved." But the search for the intention of legislators is often a formid-
able, if not impossible, task for a court to undertake. Legislative journals may
be silent on the point in question. Remarks of sponsors may be inconsistent
or inconclusive, and attacks by opponents may be steeped more in rhetoric
than in exacting analysis. The original purpose of the legislation may be
" Three of the five statutory presumptions were repealed (prospectively only) by the 1981
amendments:
(a) death due to respirable disease after ten years of employment in a mine, 30 U.S.C.
§ 921(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981);
(b) total disability from respirable disease after fifteen years of employment in a mine, 30
U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (Supp. V 1981);
(c) death after twenty-five years of employment in a mine, 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(5) (Supp. V
1981).
30 U.S.C. § 932(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
Section 205 of the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981 is codified at 30 U.S.C. § 902(i)
and 30 U.S.C. § 932.
34 Id.
' Specifically, this section requires that a claimant fail to request a hearing, present addi-
tional evidence, or manifest an intention to do so within one year of a formal notice of denial. 30
U.S.C. § 902(i)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
3- 30 U.S.C. § 902(i(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
' See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157 (1972) ("[W]hile the clear
meaning of statutory language is not to be ignored .... it is essential that we place the words of a
statute in their proper context by resort to legislative history.").
For an example of the analysis used in harmonizing statutory language and purpose, see
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (determining the scope of provisions of the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965).
1026 [Vol. 86
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hopelessly lost in the twists and turns of the decision-making process or,
possibly, the issue raised in litigation was never even contemplated by the
drafters. In spite of such obstacles, the court must seek to identify the goals
embraced by the statute-or clues as to what goals may have been intended
-in order to offer a meaningful interpretation. 9
Any attempt to discover the policy goals underlying the transfer provi-
sions of section 205 immediately poses difficulty. The history of the federal
black lung program has been characterized by "incrementalism",4° that is, an
evolutionary development brought about by the interplay of competing inter-
est groups.4 In its present form the program is an amalgam of contradictory
policy goals, one superimposed over another by repeated amendment. The re-
sulting lack of a singular theme or purpose highlights the problems involved
in determining the proper scope of section 205. Moreover, federal involve-
ment in black lung compensation has reached the point of an "identity crisis"
in which the propriety of continued federal assistance is being questioned.4 2
The original program established in 1969 exhibited a subtle tension between
its aims which persists today: it sought to assure compensation for meritor-
ious claimants while attempting to limit federal involvement.4" The statute
was essentially a temporary measure designed to promote a transition from
federal oversight to predominantly state control under workers' compensa-
tion.4 However, in the program's fourteen year history, not a single state
compensation law has been approved45 and the federal government continues
to shoulder a disproportionate share of the benefits payments.
Finally, it is important to note that the 1981 amendments themselves em-
bodied mutually antagonistic goals. First, they sought to restore financial sol-
vency to the Trust Fund, which was projected to reach a deficit of $1.5 billion
by the end of fiscal year 1981.46 This was to be accomplished by repealing or
severely restricting most of the liberalizing provisions of the 1977 amend-
" See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (where the record
was inconclusive, the Court relied on legislative history, excerpts from materials in related areas,
and policy considerations in order to divine the "legislative intent").
" This term was coined by political scientists to describe governmental decision-making in
many contexts. See, e.g., C. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PuB. AD. REV. 79
(1959).
41 Id.
'2 The 1981 Amendments, which brought the program's liberalized benefits provisions to an
abrupt halt, suggest that Congress is reassessing the federal role in black lung compensation.
11 Claims filed under Part C were intended to be processed under approved state worker's
compensation laws. The DOL was not authorized to act unless no approved law was involved or no
responsible operator could be identified. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14.
"Id.
20 C.F.R. § 722.152 (1983).
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ments" Secondly, the 1981 amendments sought to transfer liability for some
of the claims approved under section 435 to the Trust Fund, a goal appar-
ently premised on equity and fairness to coal operators. 8 The language of the
transfer provision, which is concededly ambiguous, has not surprisingly pro-
vided a hotbed of contention.
The purpose of this article is to analyze section 205 and to determine the
range of claims intended to be encompassed by the transfer provisions. In do-
ing so, constant resort must be had to the policies-expressed or implied
-underlying the statutory scheme. Where conflicting goals are encountered
which would otherwise lead to an impasse in interpretation, it will be neces-
sary to prioritize them (and seek to effectuate the paramount policy) or to
harmonize them (and seek to achieve a balance between the policies without
frustrating either of them).
III. THE PROBLEM OF DUPLICATE CLAIMS
A problem which frequently occurs in applying the transfer provisions of
section 205 involves duplicate claims for benefits. Most often, a claimant
whose Part B claim was denied by the Department of HEW thereafter filed a
Part C claim with the DOL. 9 If such a Part C claim was still pending on
March 1, 1978, or was before an administrative or judicial panel for considera-
tion at that time, it was automatically subject to review under section 435."
In those instances where the claim was approved after reevaluation, the
question naturally arises whether the responsibility for payment of benefits
is transferable. Many operators and insurance carriers urged that liability for
such claims ought to be transferred to the Trust Fund since the prior Part B
claim was a "claim denied" within the meaning of section 205. Since the
miner's claim had been previously denied, and was approved pursuant to sec-
tion 435 review, the statutory requirements for transfer had been met 1 and
the benefits were not to be paid by any operator.
This analysis is sound in those cases where the claimant has specifically
elected review of his denied Part B claim as required by statute, since the du-
plicate claims are "merged" for purposes of administration.2 The issue be-
comes more perplexing, however, where the claimant failed to formally elect
" See supra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text.
H. R. REP. No. 406, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2671, 2674.
'" Recall that Part B and Part C claims are so designed solely on the basis of the date on
which the claimant's application for benefits was filed. There was no limit placed on the number of
claims a single claimant could file. 20 C.F.R. § 410.705 (1983); 20 C.F.R. § 725.309 (1983).
0 30 U.S.C. § 945(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
", 30 U.S.C. § 932(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981). This proposed interpretation will be discussed more
fully in the following section of this article.
20 C.F.R. § 727.103(c) (1983).
[Vol. 861028
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review of his denied Part B Claim." Such a case seemingly falls within a
"twilight zone" in the statutory draftsmanship. In order to be transferable
under section 205, it is necessary that a claim be denied before March 1, 1978
and that it be approved when reopened under section 435.1 A literal reading
of the statute suggests that a duplicate Part C claim is ineligible for transfer
without an election since the claimant's Part B claim was not subsequently
approved, and the Part C claim was not previously denied.'5 However, the
liability thus imposed on the coal mine operator clearly resulted from the re-
troactive application of the 1977 amendments. In order to resolve this di-
lemma, it was necessary to determine which policy would prevail: fiscal con-
servatism or fairness and equity.
5 6
A. Round One: The Administrative Law Judges
The issue of whether transfer is permissible in the absence of an express
election of review by the claimant has been addressed in seven reported
cases.57 In each of them, the administrative law judge (ALJ) has determined
that where a Part B claim was denied, and a subsequently filed Part C claim
was approved under section 435, the requirements for transfer have been
met even where the claimant did not elect review of his Part B claim. The
ALJs have relied on two theories to support this finding.
1. Singular nature of the claim
Any claim for black lung benefits, whether filed under Part B or Part C
of the federal program, is based on a miner's total disability or death arising
out of his employment. 8 Thus, where duplicate claims have been filed by a
claimant, the subject matter of both is precisely the same: a claim of death or
disability due to occupational pneumoconiosis. The various applications con-
stitute a single claim for benefits, the ALJs have concluded, and the court
should not concern itself with the procedural history of each such
application. 9 The Part C claim should accordingly be transferred since it was
The merger regulations do not apply to this case. Id.
The 1981 act provides that a claim is transferable only if it "was the subject of a claim
denied before March 1, 1978, and ... is or has been approved in accordance with [section 435]." 30
U.S.C. § 932(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
£Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
s, Little v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 4 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) 3-16 (1982); Durkot v. Har-
mar Coal Co., 4 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) 3-117 (1982); Dye v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 5 BLACK LUNG
REP. (MB) 3-1 (1982); Pruitt v. Maggard Coal Co., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) 3-12 (1982) (dictum);
Yates v. Island Creek Coal Co., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) 3-119 (1983); Sefsick v. Y & 0 Coal Co., 5
BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) 3-146 (1982); Powers v. Long Pit Mining Co., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) 3-151
(1982).
30 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. V 1981).
E.g., Yates v. Island Creek Coal Co., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) 3-119 (1983).
1984] 1029
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"the subject of a claim denied before March 1, 1978," and was later approved
in accordance with section 435.10 As one ALJ noted in this regard:
I find that the existence of two applications does not distort the singular
nature of this matter and that their presence does not preclude the transfera-
bility of this case. Both applications arise from a singular subject, the ...
miner's claim of total disability due to pneumoconiosis. It is this subject of the
claim which is the focal point for determing the applicability of [section 205].11
The subject matter of the miner's claim remains constant regardless of the
number of applications, and responsibility for payment may be transferred
whether or not a conscious election was made.2
2. Merger
The ALJs have also reasoned that even if the claims filed are separate
and distinct, a claimant "in substance" elects review of his Part B claim by
opting to submit his pending Part C claim to automatic review by the DOL.63
In reaching this conclusion, the judges have emphasized two major points.
First, the submission of a formal election card for review of a Part B claim is
not specifically required by statute. Second, the primary purpose of section
205 was to relieve employers of their liability for benefits ensuing from the
retroactive application of the 1977 amendments." In relying solely on the
automatic review of his Part C claim, a claimant has "taken full advantage of
the simplest means for obtaining DOL review under [section] 435."' 5 The
separate claims may therefore be merged for purposes of administration, and
the previously denied Part B claim receives section 435 review vicariously."0
Since the claim was denied and subsequently approved, it meets the statu-
tory requirement for transferability. This point was persuasively presented
in a recent case:
In the instant case, Claimant's Part B claim was denied. The Claimant
also filed with the Department of Labor, which Part C claim was automatically
reviewed under the more liberal 1977 legislation .... Moreover, the automatic
review provided for the most expeditious method of obtaining section 435 re-
view. Thus in the instant case the purpose of selection was served without the
needless filing of an election postcard. In substance, an "election" occurred
' 30 U.S.C. § 932(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
" Yates v. Island Creek Coal Co., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) at 3-121.
C2 Id.
' E.g., Dye v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) 3-1 (1982).
" Id. The statute does not require in haec verba that a claimant under Part B must file an
election card to obtain review of his denied claim. It does, however, condition the Secretary's
authority to review a Part B claim on the "request of the claimant." 30 U.S.C. § 945(a)(1) (Supp. V
1981).
Yates v. Island Creek Coal Co., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) at 3-122.
See Dye v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) at 3-3.
[Vol. 861030
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under section 435 by Claimant's filing of a Part C claim which was automatic-
ally reviewed under section 435., .. Claimant's denied Part B claim was sub-
stantively elected upon, reviewed and approved under section 435, and [sec-
tion 205] is therefore applicable.'
B. Round Two: The DOL Regulations
In May, 1983 the DOL issued a final rule amending its regulations govern-
ing review of claims under section 435 to conform with the changes brought
about by the 1981 amendments. 8 The interpretation of the transfer provi-
sions offered by the DOL differed markedly from that of the published ALJ
opinions. Where duplicate claims for benefits existed, it was essential to the
transferability of a denied Part B claim that the claimant formally elect sec-
tion 435 review of such denial. 9 The alternative theories proposed by the
ALJs - singular nature of the claims and merger - were specifically rejected.0
In its accompanying commentary, the DOL called into question the ALJs'
interpretation of the purpose underlying the 1981 amendments. The judges
had suggested that the primary goal of the amendments was to relieve opera-
tors of the obligation to pay those claims which were approved after review
under the 1977 eligibility criteria.7 ' This view was attacked as being overly
broad.72 In this regard, the DOL stressed that the transfer provisions were
not intended to relieve coal operators and their insurers from all of the unan-
ticipated liability arising out of the liberal 1977 amendments. Rather, they
were to be a partial release of liability "applicable only to certain specific and
carefully defined classes of claims." 3 The 1981 amendments were designed to
accomplish not one, but three interrelated goals: 1) tightening of the pro-
gram's eligibility requirements; 2) restoring the solvency of the Trust Fund;
and 3) transferring a portion of the unanticipated liability imposed by the
1977 amendments by defining a particular class of claims to be paid out of the
67 Id.
' 48 Fed. Reg. 24,272 (1983) (to be codified in scattered sections of 20 C.F.R. Parts 718 and
725).
" The language of the new regulation reads as follows:
For a claim filed with and denied by the Social Security Administration [that is, a Part B
claim] prior to March 1, 1978, to come within the transfer provisions, such claim must
have been or must be approved under the provisions of section 435 of the Act. No claim
filed with and denied by the Social Security Administration is subject to the transfer of
liability provisions unless a request was made by or on behalf of the claimant for review
of such denied claim under section 435. Such review must have been requested by the
filing of a valid election card or other equivalent document ... in accordance with sec-
tion 435(a) and its implementing regulations ....
48 Fed. Reg. 24,292-93 (1983) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 725.496(d)).
11 See generally id. at 24,283-84.
71 E.g., Yates v. Island Creek Coal Co., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) at 3-122.
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Trust Fund."4 The ALJ view accorded too much deference to the third goal,
thereby undermining the effectiveness of the others."'
The chief flaw in the reasoning of the ALJs, the commentary emphasized,
was that their unitary treatment of duplicate claims upset the careful balance
that was struck by Congress 8 Since a claim for benefits was viewed as a
single cause of action, the presence of subsequent applications by a claimant
was of no consequence because they arose out of the same subject matter."
But claims are not susceptible of such singular treatment, the DOL retorted,
and should more properly be analogized to preliminary pleadings. Accord-
ingly, claims must be treated separately, each having a distinctive procedural
history. 8 Congress had selected only certain classes of claims to transfer to
the Trust Fund, making appropriate numerical and financial estimates on the
basis of that selection, and the DOL was not free to tamper with them. 9 A
formal election of review of a denied Part B claim was mandated by statute,
and any effort to bring such claims within the purview of section 205 by any
other means would disrupt the carefully drawn statutory scheme.
Of particular interest is the DOL's use of congressional estimates of the
number of claims affected by the transfer provisions. The consensus of legi-
slation proponents appears to have been that approximately 10,200 claims
would be transferred to the Trust Fund under section 205.81 The DOL had
raised the congressional reference to this figure in opposing transfer of Part
B claims in the absence of an election card, but the ALJs had dismissed the
argument as unpersuasive.2 The projection of the number of claims involved,
it was urged, was a matter "separate and distinct from the purpose Congress
was trying to achieve . . . -"I The DOL, on the other hand, found the esti-
mates to be strongly indicative of the legislative intent." And since the regu-
lations as drafted (specifically requiring an election card) were expected to
embrace as many as 12,000 claims, any more liberal interpretation would run
awry of the express congressional intent. 5
" Id. at 24,284.
75 Id.
76Id.
" See, e.g. Yates v. Island Creek Coal Co., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) at 3-121; Dye v. Jewell
Ridge Coal Co., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) at 3-3. This basic premise underlies both of the theories
articulated by the ALJs.
8 48 Fed. Reg. 24,283 (1983).79 d.
Id. at 24,283-84.
61 Id. at 24,282.
8 E.g., Yates v. Island Creek Coal Co., 5 BLACK LUNG REP. (MB) at 3-122.
8 Id.
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW: SECTION 205 IN THE COURTS
The many questions raised by the 1981 amendments, and the response of
the DOL through the exercise of its rulemaking power, ensure that the trans-
fer issue will ultimately make its way into the courts. The interpretations of-
fered by the administrative law judges and the DOL demonstrate a funda-
mental disagreement regarding the purpose and scope of Congress' transfer
remedy. It is unlikely that coal operators and their insurance carriers, who
worked so fervently to secure passage of section 205,86 will sit idly by in the
wake of the new regulations. The disposition of potentially thousands of
claims rests on a judicial resolution of these matters."
A. The Policy of Deference
There is a general judicial policy according deference to the interpreta-
tion of a statute made by the agency charged with administering it.' This
policy stems from a respect for the views of the "masters of the subject" who
face the task of implementing the programs outlined by Congress, and were
often instrumental in drafting the legislation they are called upon to inter-
pret. 9 But this inclination to defer to the construction placed upon statutes
by non-judicial bodies is obviously not without limits. It is the duty of the
courts to finally resolve matters of statutory construction; to permit any
other course would be tantamount to abdicating the judicial role."
A precisely defined analysis to be used in establishing whether or not
deference is to be permitted, as well as the nature and extent of such defer-
ence, are not to be found in the case law. 1 Oftentimes courts will address the
issue in an ambiguous way, or dismiss the matter in conclusory terms.2
Taken collectively, however, the cases suggest that certain criteria must be
met in order to trigger the deference principle. First, the statute which is the
subject of administrative interpretation must be ambiguous. Where the
words of a statute are plain and unequivocal, giving rise to only one reason-
Lopatto, supra note 1, at 699.
It is estimated that approximately 80% of all claims transferred will come from Part B. 48
Fed. Reg. 24,284 (1983). The number of Part B claimants who failed to file an election card is pro-
bably substantial, especially among those who subsequently filed a Part C claim. The impact of
this on earlier estimates is difficult to predict.
' See generally Annot., 39 L.Ed.2d 942 (1974).
United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877).
11 Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32
(1981); see also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965) (general admonition against judicial in-
ertia).
01 The confusing nature of the deference analysis is set out in Annot., 39 L.Ed.2d 942 (1974).
The analytic approach of the court may prove to be circular. For example, it may require
ambiguity in the statute as a prerequisite for deference, and later address the very same question
in determining the correctness of the administrative construction. Id. at 958-65.
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able construction, there is no room for interpretation and deference is imper-
missible. 3 Second, an "expressly articulated position ... as to the meaning
and impact" of the statute must be tendered by the agency which is respons-
ible for implementing it. 4 Such a requirement prevents an agency from
merely contriving post hoc justifications for its actions. 5 Finally, the admin-
istrative interpretation must not be inconsistent with the statutory mandate
or frustrate the underlying policy of the law."' This is perhaps the most de-
manding requirement. It entails not only a searching inquiry of the objectives
which the legislation seeks to achieve, but also a means-ends analysis to de-
termine whether the administrative action is in harmony with these goals.
B. The Deference Test in Operation
As previously noted, the first criterion for invoking judicial deference is
that the statute in question be ambiguous. The standard to be applied in mak-
ing this determination is one of reasonableness: the statute must be suscep-
tible of more than one reasonable interpretation. 7 The language of section
205, despite the care of legislators in the drafting process, left certain vital
matters in doubt. Perhaps the most glaring (and troublesome) omission is the
absence of a definition of the term "claim"." It is uncertain, on the fact of the
statute, whether Congress intended for the term to be construed expansively
(referring generally to the miner's claim for benefits) or restrictively (refer-
ring to specific applications for benefits under Part B or Part C). The in-
tended scope of this term is the crux of the dispute over the necessity of an
election card to ensure the transfer of a denied Part B claim." The lack of an
authorative definition prompted the need to address the problem administra-
tively by rulemaking.1" Since the 1981 amendments harbored inconsistent
goals, either of these interpretations could possibly have been within the in-
tendment of Congress. The view formally adopted by the DOL in its regula-
tions therefore meets the reasonableness test.
Another requirement for triggering the deference principle is that the in-
terpretation be made by the agency authorized to administer the law, and
Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88, 100 (1904).
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 627 (1971).
,5 Id. at 628.
Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32
(1981).
Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. at 99.
98 This omission is particularly noteworthy in view of the painstaking care taken in defining
the term "claim denied." See supra notes 35 & 36 and accompanying text.
" Both of the theories advanced by the ALJs viewed the term expansively so as to permit
transfer of liability. The restrictive view was adopted by the DOL.
"O The DOL regulations do not set out a definition of the term "claim." They do so only by in-
ference. 48 Fed. Reg. 24,292 (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 725.496(d)).
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that it be accompanied by a statement of explanation and authority. 1 The
first part of this test is easily met in regard to section 205, since the DOL is
expressly commissioned by the compensation act to oversee the processing of
both section 415 and Part C claims.10 2 This authority extends to section 435
review in all duplicate Part C claims where there has been no election. 113
Moreover, the DOL prepared a lengthy defense of its proposed regulations in
response to the comments and suggestions of industry officials and other in-
terested parties.1 4 This detailed treatment of the recommended changes in-
cluded repeated references to statutory authority as well as to the policy con-
siderations which prompted the passage of the 1981 amendments. The clarity
and completeness of this accompanying statement is sufficient to avoid the
evil eschewed by the earlier court decisions: after-the-fact rationalizations by
government agencies.
The focal point in determining whether deference is permissible is, of
course, the statutory purpose. Only where a regulation comports with both
the letter and spirit of the law to be implemented should the courts defer to
the expertise of executive officials."0 ' But, as was discussed earlier, the search
for the legislative intent is often fraught with difficulty."8 In reaching its
decision, a court must make reference to other sources which may prove
helpful in judging the accuracy of the administrative construction. The
United States Supreme Court, in addressing this matter, identified several
useful reference points.
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the congres-
sional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the regulation har-
monizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose. A
regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous
construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congres-
sional intent. If the regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which
it evolved merits inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time
the regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of
the [agency's] interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted
to the regulation during subsequent reenactments of the statute."
Bearing these factors in mind, we may make several observations regard-
ing the history of the 1981 amendments. When the federal black lung pro-
gram was established, claim applications were divided into two classes based
10 Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
102 30 U.S.C. §§ 931-45 (Supp. V 1981) (Part C claims) and 30 U.S.C. § 902(c) (Supp. V 1981).
lOS 20 C.F.R. § 727.103(c) (1983).
48 Fed. Reg. 24,272-87 (1983).
Ill Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
10 See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
Il National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U..S. 472, 477 (1979).
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upon the date of filing. This distinction was retained when the Act was
amended in 1977. The rules governing review of denied claims were based ex-
clusively on the class into which a given claim happened to fall." 8 Part C
claims were to be reevaluated automatically by the DOL, while Part B claims
would be reviewed only on the request of the claimant."9 When Congress
tackled the problem of transfer of liability, and agreed on the wording of sec-
tion 205, it was careful to preserve this distinction based upon the procedural
history of each claim."0
As was stated forcefully by the DOL, the 1981 amendments must be in-
terpreted in light of the complex array of goals they reflected."' The dis-
parity of treatment among claims based solely on their procedural status was
specifically mandated in certain cases."2 To do likewise in regard to duplicate
claims also seems in accord with congressional intention. In this regard, the
DOL argued that uniformity of treatment could be achieved only at the cost
of either refusing to transfer all denied Part B claims or permitting transfer
of liability whether or not the claimant elected review."' The first alternative
would deny coal mine operators and their insurers of the release from liabili-
ty expressly authorized by Congress. The second would result in a substan-
tially greater number of transferred claims, and would seriously jeopardize
the goal of solvency for the beleagured Trust Fund. 4
The strong interrelationship among the goals embraced by the amend-
ments and the scanty legislative record suggest that no single objective was
intended to be paramount. Congress was apparently torn between two de-
sires, and the compromise product vividly portrays the inner conflict which
dominated its pathway to approval. As a result, it is necessary to harmonize
the conflicting goals of the amendments in order to properly mark the bounds
of section 205. The informal balancing test suggested by the DOL discussion
above is well adapted to fulfill that function."' To give full effect to the goal
of relieving operators of the unanticipated liability, by making Part B claims
transferable even without an election card, would severely impair the goal of
revitalizing the Trust Fund. Similarly, emphasizing the objective of Trust
30 U.S.C. § 945 (Supp. V 1981).
109 Id.
110 30 U.S.C. § 902(i) (Supp. V 1981).
,11 48 Fed. Reg. 24,284 (1983).
112 Note, for example, the difference in treatment of otherwise identical Part C claims based
on whether the DOL denial was informal or followed a formal administrative or judicial hearing.
30 U.S.C.A. § 902(i)(2) (Supp. 1983). Informally denied Part C claims also required "abandonment"
by the claimant whereas formally denied Part C claims did not. See supra note 35 & 36 and accom-
panying text.
,13 48 Fed. Reg. 24,284 (1983).
114 Id.
11 The primary goal of harmonizing contradictory policy goals is to so balance them that the
effectiveness of each is maximized without unduly impinging on the others.
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Fund solvency would defeat the plain letter of the statute by permitting sub-
stantially fewer transfers. The compromise position espoused by the DOL in
its regulations not only enhances the efficacy of both goals, but also pre-
serves the original preference that Part B claims be reopened only upon re-
quest."' Moreover, if the figures compiled on behalf of the DOL are accurate,
the number of claims expected to be transferred under the new regulations is
more consistent with congressional estimates."7
But courts need not rely solely on the stale legislative record in order to
resolve the question of congruency between statute and regulation. Other
pertinent factors may be looked to, such as the proximity in time between
the enactment of the statute and the promulgation of the regulation."' Where
an agency prescribes rules and regulations almost contemporaneously with
the passage of a statute, it may be presumed that those responsible for inter-
preting it were conscious of the congressional intent."' In the case of the
transfer of liability provisions, the DOL first published its proposed regula-
tions in May, 1982-less than six months after the passage of the 1981
amendments."' This strengthens the case for deference. The DOL response
followed closely on the heels of the adoption of the transfer scheme, and it
may be inferred that officials were fully apprised of the purpose underlying
that provision. Courts are also permitted to consider the thoroughness, valid-
ity, and consistency of the administrative interpretation."' This, too, appears
to tip the scale in favor of deference. The statement accompanying the regu-
lations is replete with references to the interests and policies considered by
Congress, excerpts from Committee hearings and congressional debates, and
commentary."' Finally, the absence of any legislative efforts to "repeal" the
regulations, or in any way to limit their effect, may give rise to an inference
of congressional approval."' While this factor may not be compelling, espe-
cially in light of the lack of time to assess the correctness of the regulations,
it is yet another element weighing in favor of deference.
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy over the breadth of section 205 was almost inevitable
given the steadfastness of both black lung insurers and the DOL. But the
task of interpreting the 1981 Act was made difficult by the host of related
1I For a more thorough treatment of the legislative history regarding section 435 review of
Part B claims, see 48 Fed. Reg. 24,283-84 (1983).
1 Id. at 24,282.
"8 National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. at 477.
.. Id. at 477.
" 47 Fed. Reg. 22,674 (1982).
M' Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 37; see
also National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. at 477.
12 48 Fed. Reg. 24,272-87 (1983).
" Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
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questions which followed in its wake. The definition of the federal role in
black lung compensation remained unclear, and the statute made no attempt
to reconcile rival policy goals. Moreover, the purposes of Congress' transfer
remedy were shrouded in mystery, and it was necessary to rely on extrinsic
sources to divine the legislative intent. The resulting mass of data was col-
lected and analyzed by administrative law judges and the DOL, who reached
vastly differing conclusions. The purpose of this article has been to take the
dispute one step further in order to project the outcome in future judicial
review of this issue.
Of primary importance in resolving this matter is the general policy of
deference to prior administrative constructions. The deference principle, de-
spite its superficial simplicity, entails a thorough examination of the pur-
poses underlying the statute and the validity of the suggested interpretation.
The DOL regulations implementing section 205, it has been shown, do not run
contrary to the spirit of the 1981 amendments. Indeed, they achieve the laud-
able goal of carrying out all of the recognized objectives of the 1981 Act. A
conscientious review of the available information leads to the conclusion that
the DOL interpretation is consistent with the congressional mandate, and the
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